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An Error of Law and the Credibility of the Civil Resolution Tribunal 
 
Douglas C. Harris* and Sophie Marshall** 
 
The Civil Resolution Tribunal has made a serious error of law. The error is 
straightforward and clear. Over a number of decisions, the CRT has attributed words 
to the British Columbia Court of Appeal that are, instead, the words of the British 
Columbia Supreme Court. The seriousness of this error is threefold. First, the CRT is 
citing the BCCA decision as authority for the proposition that the BCCA rejected. 
Second, in misrepresenting the BCCA decision, the CRT is changing the scope of 
protection for individual strata property owners from their strata corporations. 
Finally, the CRT is compounding the error by repeating it. In this comment, we 
explain the error, outline its seriousness, and consider the implications for the CRT as 
it works to establish its credibility and expertise in the body of law that creates and 
governs strata property. 
The error of law appears first in Moore v The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 1878.1 
This case involved a dispute over the allocation of parking stalls. The owner claimed 
that the strata corporation’s assignment of parking stalls in the common property 
was significantly unfair to her, and she relied on the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act 
[CRTA], section 48.1(2), which provides the CRT with authority to make an order 
against a strata corporation “to prevent or remedy a significantly unfair action.”2 This 
section, and section 164 of the Strata Property Act [SPA] on which it is based,3 
provide individual strata property owners with protection from, and redress for, the 
unjust or inequitable decisions and actions of their strata corporation. 
To interpret “significantly unfair” the CRT turned to the BCCA decision in 
Dollan v Strata Plan BCS 1589,4 the leading interpretation of “significantly unfair” in 
the SPA. In doing so, the tribunal member in Moore wrote: 
  
26.  With reference to the Dollan v. Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44 (CanLii) case 
cited by the owner, Garson J.A. developed a new test for analysis under section 164, 
which I find would apply to an analysis under section 48.1(2) of the Act as follows: 
1.     Examined objectively, does the evidence support the asserted 
reasonable expectations of the owner? 
2.     Does the evidence establish that the reasonable expectation of the 
owner was violated by action that was significantly unfair? 
27.  I also note the court’s further comments in Dollan (my bold emphasis added): 
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1 Moore v The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 1878, 2017 BCCRT 51 [Moore]. 
2 Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, SBC 2012, c 25 [CRTA]. 
3 Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43 [SPA]. 
4 Dollan v Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44 [Dollan]. 
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There is no doubt that in making a decision the Strata Corporation must give 
consideration of the consequences of that decision. However, in my view, if 
the decision is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds, there is little 
room for a finding of significant unfairness merely because the decision 
adversely affects some owners to the benefit of others. …5 
 
The error lies in attributing “the court’s further comments” to Dollan. Garson 
JA does reproduce this passage in her reasons for decision in Dollan,6 but draws it 
from the BCSC decision in Peace v Strata Plan VIS 2165.7 In fact, the passage lies at 
the heart of the judgment in Peace that courts should review the processes and 
procedures of strata corporation decision-making for significant unfairness, but that 
there is “little room” to review the consequences of those decisions. The full 
paragraph from the decision in Peace is as follows: 
 
[55]  I have already referred to the wording of section 164 of the SPA. I repeat that 
the focus of that section is on the conduct of the Strata Corporation and not on the 
consequences of the conduct. There is no doubt that in making a decision the 
Strata Corporation must give consideration of the consequences of that 
decision.  However, in my view, if the decision is made in good faith and on 
reasonable grounds, there is little room for a finding of significant unfairness 
merely because the decision adversely affects some owners to the benefit of 
others.  This must be particularly so when the consequence complained of is one 
which is mandated by the SPA itself.8 
 
The seriousness of the error lies, first, in the fact that Garson JA specifically 
and explicitly rejected the limited scope for judicial review that the BCSC adopted in 
Peace. Instead, Garson JA held that courts should not limit themselves to reviewing 
processes and procedures, but must also consider the unfairness of outcomes. In her 
reasons for decision, Garson JA put it this way: 
 
[24] Section 164 is remedial. It addresses that, despite using a fair process and 
holding a democratic vote, the outcome of majoritarian decision-making processes 
may yield results that are significantly unfair to the interests of minority 
owners. Section 164 provides a remedy to an owner who has been treated 
significantly unfairly by co-owners or the strata council that represents them. The 
view that significantly unfair decisions reached through a fair process are insulated 
from judicial intervention would rob the section of any meaningful purpose. I agree 
with what Masuhara J. said in Gentis that the outcome of the vote is one factor to be 
considered in determining if the impugned action is unfair. I do not agree with the 
suggestion in Pearce [sic] that provided the process is fair and democratic, a court 
should defer to the decision of the strata council or corporation.9 
                                                 
5 Moore, supra note 1 at paras 26-27 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). 
6 Dollan, supra note 4 at para 21. 
7 Peace v Strata Plan VIS 2165, 2009 BCSC 1791 [Peace]. 
8 Ibid at para 55 (emphasis added to indicate the sentences reproduced in Moore). 
9 Dollan, supra note 4 at para 24 (emphasis added). 
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The justices who joined Garson JA in Dollan—Hall JA (concurring with Garson 
JA in the result) and Smith JA (in dissent)—suggested greater deference to the 
democratic decision-making of strata corporations in their reasons for decision, and 
thus less attention to the unfairness of outcomes, but both indicated that courts 
were not limited to a review of processes and procedures.10 As a result, although the 
appellate justices in Dollan did not speak with one voice, it is clear that Dollan is not 
authority for the principle that good-faith decision-making on reasonable grounds 
will insulate a strata corporation against claims of significant unfairness. If anything, 
Dollan is the standard-bearer for its opposite: courts must be attentive to processes 
and to outcomes when reviewing the decisions of strata corporations for significant 
unfairness to one or more strata property owners. 
 The CRT’s inadvertent misrepresentation of the BCSC decision in Peace as the 
BCCA’s statement of the law in Dollan is not a trivial error. As Garson JA suggests, the 
purpose of section 164 is to provide strata property owners with remedies where 
“majoritarian decision-making processes” create significant unfairness.11 In 
appearing to narrow the scope of its review of strata corporation decision-making to 
processes, the CRT is limiting the access of strata property owners to the statutory 
remedies, contrary to the direction from the BCCA. 
Finally, the CRT is compounding the seriousness of the error by repeating it. 
Since the decision in Moore, tribunal members have reproduced the same passage 
from Peace, with the same attribution to Dollan, in six subsequent decisions.12 In five 
of the seven decisions, the CRT determined that the actions or decisions of the strata 
corporations were not significantly unfair to the applicant-owners. The CRT’s error of 
law in these decisions provides the strata property owners with a clear ground for 
appeal to the BCSC.13 
Creating grounds for appeal in a growing list of cases is cause for concern, but 
the error and its repetition should also cause the CRT to reflect on the manner in 
which it uses judicial precedent and its earlier decisions as it endeavors to build 
expertise and establish credibility in strata property law. In this regard, the decisions 
of the CRT do not create binding precedent.14 Tribunal members are not required to 
follow earlier decisions. However, even if prior decisions are not binding, consistency 
in decision-making is an important value. The parties appearing at the CRT have a 
                                                 
10 Ibid at paras 43-44, 64. 
11 Ibid at para 24.  
12 Wilchek v The Owners, Strata Plan VR 55, 2017 BCCRT 67 at para 65; Pritchard v The 
Owners, Strata Plan VIS3743, 2017 BCCRT 69 at para 37; A.P. v The Owners, Strata Plan ABC, 
2017 BCCRT 94 at para 42; D.W. v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS XXX, 2017 BCCRT 107 at para 
57; Allard v The Owners, Strata Plan VIS 962, 2017 BCCRT 111 at para 101; Maslek et al v. The 
Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2778, 2018 BCCRT 106 at para 20. The tribunal member who 
authored Moore, supra note 1, also authored the four subsequent decisions. 
13 CRTA, supra note 2 s 56.5 provides for the appeal of final CRT decisions to the BCSC. 
14 This principle of administrative law applies generally to administrative tribunals, not just 
the CRT. 
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reasonable expectation that, when it comes to the final decision-making stage in the 
CRT’s process, the tribunal will approach and resolve their disputes as it has 
approached and resolved similar disputes in the past. As a result, tribunal members 
should be consulting earlier CRT decisions in considering their decisions. But in 
consulting earlier decisions, tribunal members need to be cautious about relying on 
them and on their interpretations of court decisions in particular. When citing 
important principles from the courts, tribunal members should turn to the court 
decisions themselves. In this instance, the CRT appears to have repeated its error 
because tribunal members turned to the CRT decision in Moore and to its 
representation of the BCCA decision in Dollan rather than to the BCCA decision itself. 
Errors of law will occur in administrative tribunal decisions. It may be that 
they are more likely to occur in the early years of an administrative tribunal while it 
develops its expertise. It may also be that the particular design of the CRT, with its 
“shift in emphasis away from the needs of people who provide justice processes 
[including lawyers] towards the people who use them,”15 means that errors of law 
will occur more frequently. However, we recognize that the design of the CRT 
reflected conscious and deliberate choices to enhance access to effective and 
efficient strata property dispute resolution. Our purpose in this comment is not to 
argue that the CRT should reorient its processes away from the needs of those who 
have disputes to be resolved. 
Nevertheless, we do suggest that this error of law and its repetition have 
implications for the CRT and its credibility as a body charged, among other things, 
with interpreting and applying strata property law. While the CRT establishes itself as 
an administrative tribunal with expertise in strata property law, tribunal members 
should be conscious that they are building a foundation on which strata property 
dispute resolution will rest. This foundation-building occurs in the careful authoring 
of individual decisions, but it may also require collective and collaborative work 
among tribunal members to establish the practices of interpretation that will guide 
their decision-making. It may also require drawing from the expertise of the legal 
profession in strata property law, perhaps in ways that involve lawyers in roles 
beyond that of advocates in an adversarial setting. Whatever the methods, the 
success of the CRT will turn on its capacity to provide access to effective and efficient 
dispute resolution, and on its accurate interpretation and clear application of the 
body of rules, based primarily in statute and case law, that creates and governs 
strata property. In fact, the former will depend, at least in part, on the latter. It is 
with accessibility and credibility that the CRT will best fulfill its promise of improving 
the lives of people who reside or work within the legal architecture of strata 
property. 
                                                 
15 Shannon Salter and Darin Thompson, “Public-Centred Civil Justice Redesign: a case study 
of the British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal” (2016-17) 3 McGill J Disp Resol 113 at 125. 
